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What	   is	   the	   difference	   between	   a	   chair	   and	   a	   social	   norm?	   	   Both	   are	   human	   artifacts,	  existing	   for	   human	   use.	   Yet	   think	   for	   a	   moment	   what	   would	   happen	   if,	   like	   in	   an	   old	  episode	   of	   Twilight	   Zone,	   all	   life	   on	   earth	   was	   wiped	   out.	   	   All	   life	   but	   one:	   you	   alone	  remain,	  wandering	  around	  in	  a	  world	  now	  horribly	  silent.	  	  You	  stumble	  on	  a	  broken	  chair,	  unusable.	  	  You	  may	  not	  look	  at	  it	  ever	  again,	  you	  will	  never	  sit	  on	  it,	  and	  will	  soon	  forget	  about	  that	  broken	  chair,	  but	  until	  time	  wipes	  it	  out,	  that	  chair	  will	  exist	  in	  its	  corner	  of	  the	  world.	  	  	  In	  your	  previous	  life,	  you	  were	  a	  student,	  a	  family	  member,	  a	  friend.	  	  Each	  group	  had	   its	   own	   norms,	   and	   some,	   like	   reciprocity	   or	   truth	   telling,	   were	   very	   general,	  spanning	  across	  all	  groups.	  	  You	  were	  a	  norm	  follower;	  not	  always,	  but	  most	  of	  the	  time.	  	  Now	  there	  are	  no	  norms	  to	  speak	  of.	  	  	  Truth	  telling	  makes	  no	  sense	  if	  there	  is	  nobody	  to	  talk	  to,	  and	  so	  it	  goes	  for	  every	  other	  norm	  you	  can	  think	  of.	  	  To	  exist	  at	  all,	  norms	  need	  people	  who	  collectively	  believe	  they	  exist.	  	  You	  suddenly	  realize	  you	  have	  followed	  norms	  because	   you	   thought	   other	  people	  were	   following	   them,	   and	   also	   trusted	   that	   all	   those	  people	  believed	  that	  everyone	  should	  obey	  those	  norms.	  	  You	  thought	  of	  norms	  as	  having	  an	  independent	  existence	  not	  unlike	  that	  broken	  chair,	  an	  existence	  in	  the	  world	  beyond	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  what	  people	   thought	  and	  believed	  about	   them.	   	  You	  were	  wrong:	   these	  beliefs	   are	  no	  more,	  and	  all	  norms	  have	  therefore	  ceased	  to	  exist.	  	  	   	  
	   What	  is	  the	  point	  of	  being	  honest	  and	  trustworthy,	  cooperative	  and	  fair,	  if	  there	  is	  nobody	  to	  appreciate	  and	  reciprocate	  it,	  not	  to	  mention	  to	  interact	  with?	  	  You	  used	  to	  be	  the	  proud	  member	  of	  the	  “Red	  bandanna	  group”,	  a	  group	  of	  motorcycle	  enthusiasts	  who	  met	   every	   Sunday	   to	   compete	   with	   other	   groups	   in	   reckless	   speed	   races.	   	   That	   red	  bandanna	   was	   a	   sign	   of	   distinction	   and	   belonging,	   and	   your	   pals	   would	   have	   taken	  offence	  seeing	  you	  without	  it.	   	  They	  all	  wore	  it,	  and	  thought	  it	  should	  be	  very	  visible	  on	  the	  head	  of	  every	  group	  member,	  to	  signal	  the	  privilege	  of	  being	  part	  of	  a	  gang	  that	  had	  won	   innumerable	   races.	   	  That	   group	   is	  no	  more,	   gone	  are	   the	  motorcycles	   and	   the	   red	  bandannas.	  	  You	  still	  have	  one	  in	  your	  pocket,	  though,	  should	  you	  wear	  it?	  	  You	  might,	  if	  you	  get	  nostalgic,	  but	   it	  signaling	  power	  is	  gone.	   	  There	  is	  nobody	  to	  signal	  anything	  to,	  and	  nobody	  will	  get	  offended	  and	  reproach	  you	  if	  you	  stop	  wearing	  it.	  	  
	   Norms	  are	  social	  constructs,	  like	  tables	  and	  chairs,	  but	  much	  less	  permanent	  and	  independent	  of	  our	   thinking	  about	   them.	  Though	  norms	  are	  expressed	   in	  prescribed	  or	  proscribed	  behaviors,	  actions	  we	  can	  observe	  or	  at	  least	  describe,	  these	  actions	  would	  be	  senseless,	   or	   at	   best	   lose	   their	   original	   meaning,	   without	   the	   collective	   beliefs	   that	  support	   them.	   	   So	   the	  most	   important	   question	   to	   ask	   about	   norms	   is	  what	   system	   of	  beliefs	   supports	   and	   defines	   norms.	   	   Once	   we	   understand	   these	   beliefs,	   we	   can	   tell	  whether	  the	  behaviors	  that	  we	  observe	  are	  norm-­‐driven	  or	  not,	  measure	  the	  consistency	  between	   beliefs	   and	   behavior	   under	   different	   conditions,	   and	   make	   predictions	   about	  future	  behaviors.	   	  Before	  we	  come	  to	  define	   the	  kind	  of	  beliefs	   that	  support	  and	  define	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  social	  norms,	  however,	  we	  shall	  briefly	  look	  at	  the	  most	  common,	  ubiquitous	  definitions	  of	  social	  norms,	  their	  advantages	  and	  shortcomings,	  and	  what	  can	  we	  learn	  from	  them.	  
Social	  norms	  have	  been	  extensively	  studied	  in	  the	  social	  sciences,	  though	  different	  disciplines	   have	   stressed	   different	   features	   of	   norms.	   	   Yet	   a	   shared,	   common	  understanding	  of	  what	  a	  social	  norm	  is	  can	  be	  traced	  across	  all	  fields:	  	  a	  norm	  refers	  to	  a	  
behavior	   that	   is	   collectively	   approved	   or	   disapproved	   in	   a	   group	   or	   population,	   and	   is	  
enforced	  by	  sanctions.	   	   It	   is	  also	  tacitly	  implied	  that	  social	  norms	  are	  very	  different	  from	  moral	  or	   legal	  norms,	   though	   this	  difference	   is	  not	  often	  articulated	   in	  detail.	  Although	  legal	   norms	   in	   particular	   seem	   to	   fit	   the	   collective	   approval/disapproval/sanctioning	  description,	   there	  are	   important	  differences	  between	   legal	   and	   social	  norms.	   	   First	   and	  foremost,	  a	  legal	  norm	  is	  an	  explicit,	  mandatory	  rule	  of	  behavior	  formally	  established	  by	  the	   state.	   	   It	   usually	   proscribes	   behavior,	   whereas	   social	   norms	   often	   also	   prescribe.	  	  Social	  norms	  are	  often	  unspoken	  and	  informal,	  and	  their	  origin	  is	  not	  clearly	  identifiable	  with	  a	  particular	  moment	  in	  time.	  	  They	  have	  evolved	  out	  of	  protracted	  social	  interactions,	  but	  we	   cannot	   usually	   tell	   exactly	   how	   they	   have	   evolved	   and	   in	  which	   circumstances.	  	  Whereas	   a	   legal	   norm	   explicitly	   indicates	   the	   conditions	   of	   its	   implementation,	   the	  subjects	  whose	  actions	  it	  regulates,	  their	  mutual	  rights	  and	  duties	  and	  the	  sanctions	  for	  failure	   to	   obey	   one’s	   duty,	   a	   social	   norm	   is	   much	   less	   specific.	   	   This	   difference	   is	  particularly	   evident	   in	   employer-­‐employee	   relations.	   	   Such	   relations	   are	   formally	  regulated	   by	   contracts,	   but	   the	   greatest	   influence	   is	   usually	   exerted	   by	   non-­‐legal	  incentives	   and	   sanctions,	   such	   as	   reputational	   concerns	   and	   relationship-­‐specific	  advantages.	   	   The	   social	   norms	   that	   regulate	  work	   relations	   are	  much	   less	   specific	   than	  
	   4	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   contracts,	   and	   the	   sanctions	   for	  non-­‐compliance,	   such	  as	  blacklisting	  or	  negative	  gossip,	  are	  entirely	  informal.	  	  
Social	   norms	   often	   engender	   expectations	   of	   compliance	   that	   are	   felt	   to	   be	  legitimate,	  and	  close	  in	  a	  sense	  to	  ‘having	  a	  right’	  to	  expect	  certain	  behaviors	  on	  the	  part	  of	  others,	  who	   therefore	  are	  perceived	  as	   ‘having	  an	  obligation’	   to	   act	   in	   specific	  ways.	  	  	  This	  is	  because	  we	  have	  an	  ingrained	  tendency	  to	  move	  from	  what	  is	  to	  what	  ought	  to	  be,	  and	  conclude	  that	  ‘what	  is’	  must	  be	  right	  or	  good.	  	  Yet,	  apart	  from	  our	  longstanding	  habits	  of	   performing	   and	   expecting	   others	   to	   perform	   certain	   actions,	   there	   is	   no	   deeper	  foundation	  to	  these	  presumed	  ‘rights	  and	  obligations’,	  however	  intensely	  felt	  they	  might	  be.	   	  Whereas	   violation	  of	   legal	   norms	   elicits	   formal	  negative	   sanctions,	   and	   there	   is	   no	  formal	  reward	  for	  complying	  with	  the	  law,	  the	  positive	  and	  negative	  sanctions	  that	  attach	  to	  social	  norms	  are	  quite	  different.	  	  With	  a	  social	  norm,	  the	  approved	  behavior	  is	  buoyed	  up	  by	   informal	  positive	  sanctions	  (tangible	  rewards,	  praise,	  status,	  reputation,	  etc.)	  and	  the	   censured	   behavior	   is	   discouraged	   by	   means	   of	   negative	   sanctions	   (punishments,	  shaming,	  ostracism,	  ridicule,	  etc.).	  	  	  
Note	  that	  informal	  sanctions	  are	  also	  used	  to	  discourage	  or	  support	  moral	  norms.	  	  It	  is	  debatable	  whether	  we	  can	  draw	  a	  sharp	  distinction	  between	  social	  and	  moral	  norms,	  but	  we	  usually	   refer	   to	  norms	  as	   ‘moral’	  when	   they	  have	  a	  universal	  content	   -­‐-­‐	   such	  as	  norms	  against	  harming	  others	  without	  reason	  -­‐-­‐	  and	  when	  our	  allegiance	  to	  them	  tends	  to	  be	   independent	  of	  what	  others	  do.	   	  As	  we	   shall	   see	   later,	   a	  distinguishing	   feature	  of	  social	   norms	   is	   that	   they	   are	   conditionally	   followed,	   whereas	   a	   moral	   norm	   is	  unconditional.	   	   This	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   we	   always	   obey	   moral	   norms.	   	   We	   may	   be	  tempted	  to	  perform	  ‘immoral’	  acts,	  but	  an	  excuse	  such	  as	  “I	  did	  it	  because	  others	  did	  it”	  is	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   deemed	   to	   be	   acceptable.	   	   In	   the	   case	   of	   a	   social	   norm	   instead,	   it	   is	   a	   perfectly	  reasonable	   justification.	   	   So	   it	   is	   reasonable	   to	   state	   “I	   did	   not	   pay	  my	   dues	   because	   I	  know	  nobody	  pays”,	  but	   few	  would	  accept	  “I	  raped	  and	  killed	  the	  prisoners	  because	  all	  my	  fellow	  soldiers	  did	  it”	  as	  a	  good	  reason	  to	  perform	  such	  a	  horrific	  act.	  	  
Sometime	   social	   norms	   can	   get	   internalized	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   they	   do	   not	   need	  social	  enforcement	  and	  are	  spontaneously	  adhered	  to	  by	  individuals.	  In	  this	  case	  we	  say	  that	   individuals	   are	   directly	   motivated	   to	   comply	   with	   the	   norm,	   whereas	   the	   use	   of	  sanctions	  is	  a	  form	  of	  indirect	  motivation.	  	  Sanctions,	  however,	  keep	  playing	  a	  role,	  since	  “direct	  motivation”	  may	  be	   tied	   to	   feelings	  of	  guilt	  and	  shame	  that	   the	  mere	   thought	  of	  transgression	  evokes.	  	  In	  this	  case	  an	  internal	  monitoring	  mechanism	  has	  taken	  the	  place	  of	  social	  monitoring	  and	  sanctioning.	  	  The	  sociologist	  Talcott	  Parsons	  (1951)	  was	  one	  of	  the	  main	  proponents	  of	  norm	  internalization.	  	  In	  his	  view,	  we	  form	  lasting	  dispositions	  to	  conform	  to	  our	  society’s	  norms	  through	  a	  process	  of	  socialization	  that	  starts	  within	  the	  family.	  	  This	  view	  has	  been	  criticized	  on	  two	  counts.	  	  The	  first	  refers	  to	  the	  long-­‐standing	  debate	   between	   methodological	   individualism	   and	   holism,	   which	   is	   also	   discussed	   	   in	  chapters	  X	  (on	  institutions)	  and	  Y	  (on	  game	  theory)	  of	  this	  volume.	  Since	  the	  Parsonian	  view	  accords	  priority	   to	  social	  value	  systems	  and	  views	   individuals	  as	  bearers	  of	   social	  values,	   individual	   actors	   can	   no	   longer	   be	   the	   basic	   units	   of	   analysis.	   	   This	   has	  major	  consequences	   for	   the	   study	   of	   social	   institutions.	   In	   many	   a	   sociologist’s	   view,	   social	  institutions	   cannot	   be	   explained	   as	   resulting	   from	   individual	   actions	   and	   interactions,	  since	   actions	   are	   not	   a	   primitive	   unit,	   independent	   of	   those	   very	   institutions	   they	   are	  supposed	  to	  explain.	   	   Institutions	  and	  their	  relations	  are	   the	  primitive	  units	  of	  analysis,	  irreducible	  to	  the	  microsphere	  of	  the	  individuals	  that	  act	  within	  their	  scope.	  	  This	  stands	  
	   6	  in	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   contrast	   to	   the	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   all	   social	   institutions	  can	  be	  explained	  as	  resulting	  from,	  and	  being	  reducible	  to,	  individual	  agency.	  	  	  
The	  second	  and	  more	  damaging	  criticism	  of	  Parson’s	  view	  of	  internalization	  has	  to	  do	   with	   the	   empirical	   adequacy	   of	   what	   can	   be	   inferred	   from	   it.	   	   Norms	   that	   are	  internalized	  will	  be	  very	  resistant	  to	  change,	  and	  we	  should	  observe	  a	  positive	  correlation	  between	  personal	   normative	  beliefs	  and	  action.	   	  Yet	  history	   is	   full	  of	   examples	  of	   rapid	  norm	  change	  (think	  of	  smoking	  and	  sexual	  mores),	  as	  well	  as	  swift	  norm	  emergence.	  	  As	  to	   the	   positive	   expected	   correlation	   between	   personal	   normative	   beliefs	   and	   behavior,	  there	  are	  many	  studies	  in	  social	  psychology	  that	  fail	  to	  find	  it.	  	  Even	  personal	  normative	  beliefs	   that	   are	   typically	   acquired	   during	   childhood,	   such	   as	   honesty,	   tend	   to	   be	  uncorrelated	   with	   behavior.	   	   The	   more	   secure	   positive	   correlation	   that	   is	   regularly	  observed	   is	   one	   between	   social	   normative	   beliefs	   and	   behavior.	   	  Whenever	   individuals	  think	  that	  the	  relevant	  group	  holds	  certain	  normative	  beliefs,	  they	  will	  be	  inclined	  to	  act	  according	  to	  them	  even	  if,	  personally,	  they	  may	  be	  indifferent	  or	  even	  opposed	  to	  those	  actions	  .	  	  Indeed,	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  social	  norm	  usually	  leads	  to	  actions	  consistent	  with	  it,	  provided	   it	   demands	   behavior	   that	   a	   reference	   group	   defines	   as	   appropriate	   and	  desirable;	   this	   fact,	   however,	   militates	   against	   the	   internalization	   view	   of	   norms	   as	   a	  
general	  account	  of	  conformity.	  	  	  
There	  are,	  however,	  two	  alternative	  interpretations	  of	  internalization	  that	  do	  not	  stand	  in	  sharp	  contrast	  with	  these	  empirical	  observations	  about	  usual	  norm	  compliance.	  	  One	  interpretation	  is	  moral,	  the	  other	  cognitive.	  	  We	  cannot	  deny	  that	  there	  exist	  norms	  that	  we	   have	   internalized	   to	   the	   point	   that	   almost	   no	   variance	   exists	   in	   norm-­‐induced	  behaviors.	  	  Such	  norms	  are	  typically	  proscriptive,	  and	  as	  such	  not	  likely	  to	  be	  correlated	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  with	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   Take,	   for	   example,	   norms	   that	   proscribe	   inflicting	  unwarranted,	  gratuitous	  harm.	  	  By	  and	  large,	  harming	  someone	  for	  no	  reason	  is	  not	  even	  conceived	  as	  an	  option,	  as	  the	  mere	  thought	  of	  performing	  a	  destructive,	  unjustified	  act	  spawns	  revulsion	  and	  guilt	   in	  most	  of	  us.	   	  Such	  norms	  are	  internalized	  to	  the	  point	  that	  we	  become	  aware	  of	   their	   force	  only	  when	   faced	  with	  a	  violation,	  and	  our	  allegiance	   is	  perceived	  as	  unconditional.	  What	  we	  usually	  call	  moral	  norms,	  insofar	  as	  we	  understand	  them	   to	   be	   internalized,	   unconditional	   imperatives,	   fit	   the	   above	   description.	   	   It	   is	   an	  open	   question	  whether	  we	   are	   born	  with	   a	   ‘moral	   organ’	   shaped	   by	   evolution	   or	   it	   is	  society	   that	   shapes	   our	   moral	   sensibilities.	   	   In	   any	   case,	   social	   norms	   are	   not	  unconditionally	  followed	  and	  are	  not	  internalized	  in	  the	  above	  sense,	  unless	  we	  want	  to	  blunt	  the	  boundaries	  between	  the	  moral	  and	  the	  social.	  	  	  
The	  second	  interpretation	  of	  internalization	  is	  my	  own	  cognitive	  one.	  	  Many	  of	  the	  norms	   we	   follow	   are	   learned,	   often	   through	   repeated	   interactions	   in	   a	   variety	   of	  situations	  that	  we	  come	  to	  categorize	  as	  typical	  cases	  to	  which	  the	  norm	  applies.	  	  So	  we	  learn	   to	   accept	   and	   return	   favors	   and	   gifts,	   but	   not	   bribes;	   	   to	   share	   equally,	   but	   also	  reward	  merit	  and	  make	  allowance	   for	  need.	   	   	  We	   learn	  when	  and	  how	  to	  greet,	  how	  to	  behave	  at	  a	  party	  and	  what	  to	  say	  at	  a	   funeral.	   	  When	  we	  find	  ourselves	   in	  one	   ‘typical’	  situation	   where	   a	   learned	   norm	   applies,	   we	   tend	   to	   conform	   in	   automatic	   ways.	   	   The	  norms	  we	  learn	  we	  uphold	  as	  “default	  rules”,	  ready	  to	  apply	  them	  to	  similar	  cases	  until	  it	  becomes	   evident	   that	   conformity	   has	   become	   too	   costly.	   	   It	   is	   well	   known	   that,	   in	  repeated	   social	   dilemmas	   of	   the	   kind	   discussed	   in	   Chapter	   X	   (KSs]	   ,	   players	   start	   by	  cooperating	   but	   cooperation	   precipitously	   declines	   as	   soon	   as	   someone;	   the	   players	  adopt	  cooperation	  as	  a	  default	  rule,	  but	  are	  ready	  to	  abandon	  it	  when	  they	  realize	  it	  has	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  costs.	  	  Internalization	  in	  this	  sense	  means	  we	  economize	  on	  thought,	  not	  that	  the	  norms	  that	  society	  has	  imposed	  on	  us	  are	  so	  deeply	  entrenched	  as	  to	  be	  inflexible	  and	  unchangeable.	  
The	  very	  generic	  definition	  of	  norms	  as	  socially	  approved	  behavior	  supported	  by	  sanctions	   tells	  us	   two	   important	   things:	   first,	   social	  norms	  are	  closely	   tied	   to	  sanctions;	  without	   sanctions	   (internal	   or	   external),	   they	  may	   not	   exist.	   	   Second,	   part	   of	   the	   very	  definition	   of	   norm	   is	   that	   it	   refers	   to	   behaviors	   and	   patterns	   of	   behavior	   that	   are	  collectively	   approved	   or	   disapproved,	   hence	   such	   behaviors	  matter	   to	   people.	   	   A	   lot	   of	  attention	   has	   been	   paid	   to	   the	   question	   why	   certain	   behaviors	   matter	   so	   much	   that	  people	  will	   go	   to	   great	   lengths	   to	  make	   sure	   they	   are	   adhered	   to,	   and	   engage	   in	   costly	  sanctioning	   to	   support	   them.	   	   An	   obvious	   answer	   is	   that	   norms	   perform	   critical	   social	  
functions,	   such	   as	   attaining	   social	   order	   and	   useful	   collective	   action,	   or	   even	   help	   one	  group	   to	   exclude	   or	   discriminate	   against	   another	   group,	   thus	   keeping	   vital	   resources	  within	  the	  group	  .	  Yet	  saying	  that	  a	  norm	  performs	  an	  important	  social	  function	  does	  not	  explain	   how	   it	   originated,	   or	   why	   we	   keep	   obeying	   it.	   	   A	   norm	   may	   have	   evolved	   to	  smooth	  social	   interactions,	   and	   it	  may	  keep	  doing	  so	  quite	  efficiently,	  but	  we	  would	  be	  hard	  pressed	  to	  say	  that	  this	  is	  the	  reason	  why	  it	  came	  about.	  	  	  
	   Take	   reciprocity:	   it	   is	   certainly	   important	   to	   live	   in	   a	   social	   environment	  where	  people	   reciprocate	   valuable,	   beneficial	   actions.	   	  Without	   reciprocity	   there	  would	   be	   no	  trust,	  and	  without	  trust	  we	  would	  have	  no	  markets	  or	  modern	  political	  systems:	  markets	  and	  democracy	   rely	  on	  people	   trusting	   their	  business	  partners,	   as	  well	   as	   their	   elected	  representatives.	   	   Recognizing	   the	   social	   importance	   of	   trust,	   we	   care	   for	   and	   support	  norms	   of	   reciprocity,	   and	   in	   this	   sense	  we	  may	   say	   that	   their	   stability	   is	   linked	   to	   the	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  they	   fulfill.	   	  Their	  origin,	  however,	  cannot	  be	  explained	   in	  this	  way.	   	  A	  social	  function	  a	  norm	  comes	  to	  play	  is	  not	  the	  cause	  of	  its	  spontaneous	  emergence.	  Take,	  again,	  a	  norm	  of	  reciprocity.	  	  A	  society	  may	  have	  evolved	  several	  strategies	  that	  promote	  reciprocation	  of	  trust;	  all	  these	  strategies	  involve	  some	  punishment	  for	  non-­‐reciprocators,	  from	   mild	   to	   harsh,	   and	   they	   can	   exist	   along	   each	   other.	   	   Taken	   together,	   all	   these	  strategies	  result	  in	  observationally	  equivalent	  behaviors:	  almost	  all	  individuals	  trust	  and	  reciprocate,	  but	   the	  norm	   itself	   results	   from	  many	  different	   strategies.	   	  The	   individuals	  who	   adopt	   one	   of	   these	   strategies	   do	   so	   because	   it	   is	   in	   their	   long-­‐run	   interest	   to	  reciprocate	  trust,	  not	  because	  society	  at	  large	  benefits	  from	  it.	  	  
Yet	   the	   social	   function	   a	   norm	   plays	   may,	   and	   often	   does,	   explain	   its	   stability	  within	  a	  population.	  	  This	  statement	  needs	  qualification.	  	  A	  norm	  is	  stable	  if	  it	  is	  durably	  obeyed	   by	   great	   part	   of	   the	   population	   (or	   group)	   in	   which	   the	   norm	   exists.	  	  Transgressions	  occur,	  but	  they	  do	  not	  challenge	  the	  norm’s	  permanence.	   	  This	  does	  not	  mean	   that	   compliance	  with	   a	   norm	   is	  mainly	   due	   to	   our	   being	   conscious	   of	   the	   social	  functions	   it	   performs,	   so	   that	   knowing	   its	   beneficial	   function	   gives	   us	   an	   overriding	  
reason	  to	  obey	  it.	  	  Often	  we	  are	  not	  fully	  aware	  of	  the	  social	  benefits	  of	  a	  particular	  norm,	  but	   even	   if	  we	   are,	   our	   reasons	   to	   obey	   it	   are	   often	  much	   less	  worthy.	   	   If	   knowing	   the	  benefits	   of	   cooperation	   were	   a	   sufficient	   reason	   to	   cooperate,	   there	   would	   be	   no	   free	  riders,	  i.e.,	  people	  who	  do	  not	  cooperate	  with	  others	  but	  benefit	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  others	  cooperate.	   	   Think	   of	   taxpayers;	   we	   have	   public	   services	   that	   anyone	   can	   use	   because	  people	  support	  them	  by	  paying	  taxes.	  	  Someone	  who	  does	  not	  pay,	  however,	  can	  still	  use	  and	  benefit	  from	  these	  services.	  We	  have	  norms	  precisely	  because	  there	  is	  often	  a	  tension	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  between	  what	  we	  would	  like	  to	  do	  (skirt	  a	  common	  task,	  avoid	  paying	  our	  dues,	  being	  less	  than	  fair)	  and	  what	  is	  socially	  beneficial.	  	  	  
To	  explain	  a	  norm’s	  stability,	  as	  well	  as	  its	  existence,	  we	  have	  to	  look	  further	  into	  the	   reasons	  why	   individuals	   conform.	   	   If	  we	   are	   less	   than	   fully	   aware	  of	   the	  benefits	   a	  norm	  may	  bestow	  upon	   society	   or,	   even	   if	   aware,	  we	   are	   not	   fully	  motivated	   by	   them,	  why	  do	  we	  conform?	   	  Many	  believe	   the	  answer	   lies	   in	   the	  existence	  of	  sanctions.	   	  They	  may	  be	  internal,	  as	  when	  we	  say	  that	  a	  norm	  has	  been	  internalized,	  by	  which	  we	  mean	  it	  has	  become	  part	  of	  our	  value	  system.	  	  Or,	  more	  often	  than	  not,	  external	  sanctions	  are	  at	  work	   to	  keep	  people	   in	   line.	   	   In	   this	   case,	  we	   say	   that	   there	   is	   a	   rational	  motivation	   to	  obey	   a	   norm:	   we	   want	   to	   reap	   the	   benefits	   of	   conformity	   or	   avoid	   the	   costs	   of	  transgression.	   	   If	   we	   think	   of	   individuals	   as	   rational	   decision-­‐makers,	   we	   can	   see	   the	  appeal	  of	  this	  view	  of	  norm	  compliance.	   	  Norms	  are	  exogenous,	  external	  constraints	  we	  have	   to	   take	   into	  account	  when	  we	  make	  a	  choice.	   	  Economists	  are	  particularly	   fond	  of	  this	   view;	   a	  norm	   is,	   not	  unlike	   a	  budget	   constraint,	   a	   constraint	  on	   the	   set	  of	  possible	  actions	  one	  may	   take.	   	  The	   constraint,	   in	   fact,	   is	  not	   the	  norm	  per	   se,	   but	   the	  expected	  consequences	  of	   disobeying	   it.	   	   In	   this	   view,	   if	   the	   expected	  benefits	   of	   transgressing	   a	  norm	  are	  greater	  than	  the	  expected	  punishment,	  people	  will	  not	  conform.	  	  A	  main	  point	  to	   notice	   about	   the	   cost/benefit	   view	   of	   conformity	   is	   that	   it	   disentangles	   conformity	  from	  attribution	  of	  value,	  i.e.,	  one	  may	  conform	  to	  a	  norm	  even	  if,	  for	  that	  individual,	  the	  norm	  has	  no	  value.	  	  We	  shall	  come	  back	  to	  this	  important	  point	  later.	  	  
Yet	  most	  of	  our	  actions	  do	  not	  stem	  from	  a	  cost/benefit	  calculation,	  at	  least	  not	  a	  conscious	  one.	   	  As	  I	  mentioned	  before,	  norms	  are	  more	  often	  than	  not	  like	  default	  rules	  that	  we	  mindlessly	   follow	   in	   the	   appropriate	   circumstances.	   	  We	   are	   not	  aware	   of	   the	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  possible	   sanctions,	   even	   if	   it	   is	   hard	   to	   deny	   that	   sanctions	   often	   do	   play	   a	   role	   in	  driving	  conscious	  compliance,	  especially	  in	  those	  cases	  in	  which	  people	  do	  not	  care	  much	  about	  what	  the	  norm	  stands	  for	  (think	  of	  foreign	  women	  having	  to	  cover	  their	  heads	  in	  a	  Muslim	   country).	   	   Since	   the	   cost/benefit	   model	   can	   be	   thought	   of	   as	   a	   rational	  
reconstruction	   of	  norm	  conformity,	  we	   can	  disentangle	  awareness	   from	  rational	   choice.	  	  The	  cost/benefit	  model	  specifies	  when	  and	  why	  norm	  compliance	  is	  rational,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  profess	  to	  be	  a	  realistic,	  precise	  description	  of	  the	  way	  we	  in	  fact	  deliberate.	   	   It	   just	  says	   that,	  were	  we	   aware	  of	   the	  presence	  of	   sanctions,	  we	  would	   choose	   the	   course	  of	  action	  that	  minimizes	  costs.	  Even	  a	  rational	  reconstruction,	  however,	  has	  its	  constraints.	  A	   cost/benefit	  model	  must	   require	   that,	  were	   sanctions	   clearly	   absent,	   behavior	  would	  change	   in	   predictable	   ways.	   	   A	   good	   model,	   however	   abstract,	   must	   make	   testable	  predictions.	  	  
Another,	  more	   important	  objection	   to	   the	  cost/benefit	  view	  of	  motivation	  has	   to	  do	   with	   interdependent	   expectations.	   	   In	   that	   view,	   avoidance	   of	   negative	   sanctions	  constitutes	   a	   decisive	   reason	   to	   conform,	   irrespective	   of	   what	   others	   do.	   	   The	   only	  expectations	  that	  matter	  are	  those	  about	  the	  sanctions	  that	  will	  ensue.	  	  What	  others	  do	  or	  do	  not	  do	  is	  irrelevant	  to	  motivation.	  	  The	  traditional	  rational	  choice/cost-­‐benefit	  model	  depicts	  a	  decision-­‐maker	  that	  stands	  alone	  in	  the	  face	  of	  uncertainty	  and	  a	  measurement	  problem.	   	   All	   that	  matters	   is	   how	   one	   should	   assess	   the	   present	   and	   future	   costs	   and	  benefits	   of	   incurring	   or	   avoiding	   sanctions,	   the	   severity	   of	   these	   sanctions,	   and	   the	  probability	  of	  being	  monitored	  and	  caught.	  	  
In	  reality	  we	  are	  embedded	  in	  a	  thick	  network	  of	  relations,	  we	  constantly	  interact	  with	  others,	  and	  what	  they	  do	  and	  think	  matter	  a	  great	  deal	  to	  us.	  	  Game	  theory	  that,	  as	  
	   12	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  Chapter	  X	  (decision	  and	  game	  theory),	  studies	   interactive	  decision-­‐making,	  provides	  a	  framework	  for	  understanding	  social	  interactions	  and	  the	  mutual	  expectations	  that	   accompany	   them	   and	   thus	   provides	   good,	   if	   incomplete,	   models	   for	   the	   kind	   of	  decisions	   involved	   in	   following	   a	   norm.	   	   It	   allows	   a	   micro-­‐level	   analysis	   of	   how	   the	  incentives	  to	  behave	  in	  specific	  ways	  are	  influenced	  by	  others’	  behavior,	  and	  in	  what	  way	  behaviors	  are	  interdependent.	  	  
From	   social	   psychology	   we	   know	   that	   only	   some	   expectations	   are	   positively	  correlated	  with	  norm-­‐abiding	  behavior:	  only	  those	  normative	  beliefs	  that	  people	  perceive	  to	   be	   collectively	   shared	   and	   put	   into	   practice	  matter	   to	   action.	   	   Casting	   aside	   for	   the	  moment	  the	  issue	  of	  how	  to	  differentiate	  among	  types	  of	  expectations,	  we	  want	  to	  know	  how	   a	   game-­‐theoretic	   model	   can	   broadly	   represent	   how	   individuals’	   expectations	  converge	  and	  prompt	   individuals	   to	  behave	  according	   to	   them.	   	  To	  see	  what	   I	  mean	  by	  convergence	   of	   expectations,	   let’s	   suppose	   we	   all	   believe,	   for	   whatever	   reason,	   that	  within	  a	  month	  there	  will	  be	  a	  market	  crash.	  	  We	  act	  on	  those	  beliefs	  and	  immediately	  sell	  our	   stock	   positions.	   	   This	   sudden	   sale	   depresses	   stock	   prices	   and,	   indeed,	   the	   market	  tanks.	   	  The	  market	   expectations	  were	  by	  no	  means	  normative,	   but	   they	  give	  us	   a	   vivid	  example	  of	  how	  collective	  expectations	  can	  bring	  on	  actions	  that	  make	  those	  expectations	  true.	  	  These	  are	  what	  we	  call	  self-­‐fulfilling	  expectations	  and	  I	  want	  to	  argue	  that	  they	  have	  a	  lot	  to	  do	  with	  how	  norms	  persist.	  	  As	  you	  learn	  from	  Ch	  X	  [KSs],	  game	  theory	  is	  a	  good	  tool	   if	   we	   want	   to	   model	   the	   interaction	   of	   beliefs	   (expectations)	   and	   behavior,	   and	  several	  authors	  have	  used	  it	  to	  give	  an	  account	  of	  norms	  and	  conventions.	   	  However,	  as	  we	   shall	   see,	   game	   theory	   falls	   short	   of	   producing	   a	   satisfactory	   account	   of	   the	   role	  different	  kinds	  of	  expectation	  play	  in	  conformity.	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Norms	  as	  equilibria:	  the	  game	  theory	  connection	  
Various	   authors,	   including	   myself,	   have	   proposed	   a	   game-­‐theoretic	   account	  according	   to	  which	   a	   convention	   or	   a	   norm	  are	   broadly	   defined	   as	  Nash	  equilibria.	   	   As	  	  Chapter	  X	   (decision	  and	  game	   theory)	  explains,	   a	  Nash	  equilibrium	   is	  a	   combination	  of	  strategies,	  one	  for	  each	  player,	  such	  that	  each	  individual's	  strategy	  is	  a	  best	  reply	  to	  the	  others'	  strategies,	  were	  one	  to	  take	  them	  as	  given.	  	  This	  means	  that	  a	  Nash	  equilibrium	  is	  an	   outcome	  of	   the	   game	   from	  which	  no	   individual	   player	  has	   any	   incentive	   to	  diverge.	  This	   outcome,	   however,	   is	   not	   necessarily	   the	   most	   efficient	   (think	   of	   the	   mutual	  defection	  equilibrium	  in	  the	  prisoner’s	  dilemma	  described	  in	  Ch	  X	  [KSs]);	  it	  is	  just	  one	  to	  which	  the	  players	  will	  converge,	  if	  they	  are	  acting	  rationally	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  beliefs.	  
Most	  of	  these	  authors	  were	  interested	  in	  conventions,	  but	  social	  norms,	  too,	  can	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  equilibria.	   	  Since	  it	  is	  an	  equilibrium,	  a	  norm	  is	  supported	  by	  self-­‐fulfilling	  expectations,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  in	  equilibrium	  players’	  beliefs	  are	  mutually	  consistent,	  and	  thus	   the	  actions	   that	   follow	  from	  those	  beliefs	  will	  validate	   them.	   	  Characterizing	  social	  norms	  as	  equilibria	  has	  the	  advantage	  of	  emphasizing	  the	  role	  that	  expectations	  play	  in	  upholding	  norms.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  this	  interpretation	  of	  social	  norms	  does	  not	  prima	  
facie	  explain	  why	  people	  prefer	  to	  conform	  if	  they	  expect	  others	  to	  conform.1	  	  After	  all,	  if	  everyone	   cooperates	   the	   defector	   will	   reap	   great	   benefits,	   so	   the	   mere	   expectation	   of	  universal	  cooperation	  may	  not	  be	  enough	  to	  induce	  good	  behavior.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  The	  numbers	  (or	  letters)	  we	  put	  in	  the	  cells	  of	  a	  game	  matrix	  represent	  ‘utiles’	  that	  illustrate	  how	  much	  a	  player	  likes	  a	  particular	  outcome	  of	  the	  game.	  	  Why	  a	  player	  has	  those	  ‘utiles’	  is	  not	  a	  question	  game	  theory	  can	  answer.	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  When	  I	  mentioned	  the	  stability	  of	  norms	  I	  said	  that,	  in	  order	  to	  explain	  stability,	  we	  have	   to	  understand	  why	  people	  conform.	   	  The	  game-­‐theoretic	  account	  gives	  a	   clear	  answer	  in	  the	  case	  of	  conventions.	  	  Take	  for	  example	  conventions	  such	  as	  putting	  the	  fork	  to	  the	  left	  of	  the	  plate,	  adopting	  a	  dress	  code,	  using	  a	  particular	  sign	  language,	  or	  blowing	  one's	   nose	   with	   a	   handkerchief.	   	   In	   all	   these	   cases,	   my	   choice	   to	   follow	   a	   certain	  behavioral	  rule	  is	  usually	  conditional	  upon	  expecting	  most	  other	  people	  to	  follow	  it.	  	  I	  say	  ‘usually’	   because	   one	  may	   have	   other,	   overriding	   reasons	   to	   follow	   a	   rule.	   	   Take	   dress	  codes:	   For	   a	   very	   religious	   person,	   wearing	   a	   yarmulke/skullcap	   may	   represent	   one’s	  compact	  with	  God,	  and	  be	  completely	  independent	  of	  expecting	  others	  to	  do	  the	  same.	  	  In	  this	  case	  we	  cannot	  say	  that	  that	  person	  is	  following	  a	  convention.	  In	  a	  convention,	  on	  the	  contrary,	   mutual	   expectations	   are	   everything.	   	   Once	   my	   expectation	   about	   others’	  behavior	  is	  met,	  I	  have	  every	  reason	  to	  adopt	  the	  behavior	  in	  question.	  	  	  If	  I	  do	  not	  use	  the	  sign	   language	  everybody	  else	  uses,	   I	  will	  not	  be	  able	   to	  communicate,	  and	   if	   I	  blow	  my	  nose	   in	  my	   hands	  when	   everybody	   else	   uses	   handkerchiefs,	   I	  will	   send	   out	   the	  wrong	  signal	  about	  who	  I	  am.	  	  It	  is	  in	  my	  immediate	  interest	  to	  follow	  a	  convention,	  if	  my	  main	  goal	  is	  to	  coordinate	  with	  other	  people.	  	  So	  if	  I	  expect	  others	  to	  act	  in	  a	  certain	  way,	  and	  I	  want	   to	   coordinate	   with	   them,	   I	   will	   adopt	   that	   behavior.	   	   Why	   one	   may	   want	   to	  coordinate	  with	  others	  is	  another	  issue.	  	  All	  the	  examples	  that	  are	  typically	  employed	  to	  illustrate	  conventions,	   like	  driving	  or	  language,	  rely	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  one’s	  goal	  can	  only	  be	   achieved	   by	   doing	   what	   others	   do.	   	   So	   if	   I	   want	   to	   be	   safe	   on	   the	   road	   or	   just	  communicate,	  I	  will	  have	  to	  coordinate	  my	  actions	  with	  those	  of	  other	  people.	  	  
In	   the	   case	   of	   conventions,	   there	   is	   continuity	   between	   individual’s	   self	   interest	  and	   the	   interests	   of	   the	   community	   that	   support	   the	   convention.	   	   It	   is	   an	   example	   of	  
	   15	  harmonious	  interests:	  We	  all	  want	  to	  drive	  safely	  and	  speak	  the	  same	  language.	  	  This	  is	  the	  reason	  why	  David	  Lewis	  (1969)	  represented	  conventions	  as	  equilibria	  of	  coordination	  
games.	   	   Such	   games	   have	  multiple	   equilibria,	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   –	   to	   communicate	   –	  we	  need	   a	   language,	   but	   which	   one	   among	   many	   is	   irrelevant.	   (See	   Ch	   X	   [KSs]	   for	   more	  discussion	  of	  multiple	   equilibria.)	  The	   same	  goes	   for	  driving:	   to	  be	   safe,	  we	  need	   to	   all	  drive	  to	  the	  right	  or	  to	  the	   left,	  but	  which	  way	  we	  coordinate	  upon	  is	   irrelevant.	  Any	  of	  these	   coordination	   points	   is,	   from	   the	   viewpoint	   of	   achieving	   our	   common	   goal,	   an	  equally	   plausible	   outcome.	   	   Once	   one	   of	   the	   possible	   equilibria	   has	   been	   established,	  players	  will	  have	  every	  incentive	  to	  keep	  playing	  it,	  as	  any	  deviation	  will	  be	  costly	  for	  the	  deviant.	  	  
Social	  norms	  are	  a	  different	  story.	  	  For	  one,	  the	  fact	  that	  sanctions	  do	  play	  a	  role	  in	  compliance	   suggests	   that	   following	   a	   norm	   may	   not	   be	   in	   the	   individual’s	   immediate	  interest.	  	  Behaviors	  that	  are	  socially	  beneficial,	  when	  not	  mandated	  by	  law,	  are	  normally	  supported	   by	   social	   norms	   that	   involve	   sanctions,	   both	   positive	   and	   negative.	   	   Social	  dilemmas,	   such	   as	   overpopulation,	   pollution,	   or	   energy	   conservation	   are	   examples	   of	  situations	  in	  which	  each	  individual	  profits	  from	  free	  riding,	  but	  the	  group	  is	  better	  off	  if	  everyone	  contributes.	  	  Pro-­‐social	  norms	  such	  as	  norms	  of	  cooperation	  or	  reciprocity	  have	  evolved	  to	  solve	  such	  dilemmas,	  and	  we	  often	  refer	  to	  them	  as	  unambiguous	  examples	  of	  the	  discontinuity	  between	  individual	  and	  collective	  interests.	  	  Not	  all	  norms	  have	  evolved	  for	   this	   reason,	   however.	   	   	   Norms	   of	   honor	   killing	   do	   not	   seem	   to	   be	   related	   to	   the	  provision	   of	   any	   collective	   good,	   even	   if	   honor	   is	   the	   highest	   valued	   virtue	   in	   some	  cultures.2	  	  Conforming	  to	  an	  honor	  code	  confers	  or	  restores	  status	  to	  those	  who	  comply	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Honor	  killings	  are	  murders	  of	  women	  by	   family	  members	   that	   are	   justified	  as	   removing	   some	   imputed	  stain	  on	  the	  family’s	  honor.  Men	  are	  occasionally	  killed,	  but	  the	  large	  majority	  of	  victims	  are	  women.	   	   In	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  with	   it,	   and	   not	   conforming	   is	   severely	   sanctioned	   by	   the	   community.	   	   Strict	   honor	  codes	  are	  costly	   to	  enforce	   (you	  may	  have	   to	  kill	  your	  own	  sister	  or	  daughter),	  but	   the	  temptation	  to	  evade	  the	  norm	  is	  tempered	  by	  the	  presence	  of	  positive	  (status,	  honor)	  and	  negative	  (stigma,	  ridicule,	  lack	  of	  trust)	  sanctions.	  	  In	  [Yotam	  Feldners’	  words,	  “the	  honor	  of	  the	  Arab	  family	  or	  tribe,	  the	  respect	  accorded	  it,	  can	  be	  gravely	  damaged	  when	  one	  of	  its	   women's	   chastity	   is	   violated	   or	   when	   her	   reputation	   is	   tainted.	   Consequently,	   a	  violation	  of	  a	  woman's	  honor	  requires	  severe	  action,	  as	  Tarrad	  Fayiz,	  a	   Jordanian	  tribal	  leader,	  explains:	   ‘A	  woman	   is	   like	  an	  olive	   tree.	  When	   its	  branch	  catches	  woodworm,	   it	  has	   to	   be	   chopped	   off	   so	   that	   society	   stays	   clean	   and	   pure.’	   	  The	  murder	   of	  women	   to	  salvage	   their	   family's	   honor	   results	   in	   good	   part	   from	   the	   social	   and	   psychological	  pressure	   felt	   by	   the	   killers,	   as	   they	   explain	   in	   their	   confessions.	  Murderers	   repeatedly	  testify	  that	  their	  immediate	  social	  circle,	  family,	  clan,	  village,	  or	  others	  expected	  them	  and	  encouraged	   them	   to	   commit	   the	   murder.	   From	   society's	   perspective,	   refraining	   from	  killing	  the	  woman	  debases	  her	  relatives.”3	  	  
We	  still	  have	  a	  tension	  between	  the	  individual	  and	  the	  collective,	  albeit	  one	  that	  is	  less	  transparent	  than	  what	  we	  see	  in	  a	  social	  dilemma.	  	  The	  point	  to	  be	  made	  is	  that	  social	  norms,	  as	  opposed	  to	  conventions,	  do	  not	  arise	  out	  of	  situations	  of	  harmonious	  interests,	  but	  out	  of	  situations	  in	  which	  a	  potential	  or	  open	  conflict	  exists	  between	  individual	  and	  group	  interests.	  	  	  	  
You	  will	  learn	  about	  game	  theory	  in	  Chapter	  X	  [KSs]	  and	  I	  will	  presume	  here	  that	  you	  are	  comfortable	  with	  some	  of	  the	  ideas	  and	  language	  from	  there.	   	  The	  typical	  game	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  the	  honor	  killing	   culture,	   a	  man	  who	  refrains	   from	  "washing	   shame	  with	  blood"	   is	   a	   "coward	  who	   is	  not	  worthy	  of	  living	  ...	  as	  less	  than	  a	  man"	  	  (Feldner	  2000).	  3	  Y. Feldner, 2000, p. 42	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  that	  represents	  a	  state	  of	  affairs	  in	  which	  following	  a	  pro-­‐social	  norm	  would	  provide	  a	  better	   collective	   solution	   than	   the	  one	   attained	  by	   a	   rational,	   selfish	   choice,	   is	   a	  mixed-­‐
motive	   game.	   	   In	   such	   games	   the	   unique	   Nash	   equilibrium	   represents	   a	   suboptimal	  outcome,	  but	  there	  is	  no	  way	  to	  do	  better	  within	  the	  confines	  of	  the	  game.	  	  I	  have	  argued	  	  that	   pro-­‐social	   norms,	   as	   opposed	   to	   conventions,	   are	   never	   born	   as	   equilibria	   of	   the	  mixed-­‐motive	   games	   they	   ultimately	   transform.	   	   Whereas	   a	   convention	   is	   one	   among	  several	  equilibria	  of	  a	  coordination	  game,	  a	  norm	  can	  never	  be	  an	  equilibrium	  of	  a	  mixed-­‐motive	  game	  (such	  as,	  for	  example,	  a	  prisoner’s	  dilemma	  or	  a	  trust	  game).	  	  When	  a	  norm	  exists,	  however,	  it	  transforms	  the	  original	  mixed-­‐motive	  game	  into	  a	  coordination	  one.	  	  As	  an	   example,	   consider	   the	   following	   prisoner’s	   dilemma	   game	   (Figure	   1),	   where	   the	  payoffs	  are	  B=Best,	  S=Second,	  T=	  Third,	  and	  W=	  Worst.	  	  Clearly	  the	  only	  Nash	  equilibrium	  is	  for	  both	  players	  to	  defect	  (D),	  in	  which	  case	  both	  get	  (T,T),	  a	  suboptimal	  outcome.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Other	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Cooperate	   Defect	  
	  	   Cooperate	   	  	   S,	  S	   	  	   W,	  B	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A	  coordination	  game	  
Figure	  2	  
	  
Note	  that	  in	  the	  new	  coordination	  game	  created	  by	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  cooperative	  norm,	  the	  payoffs	   are	  different	   from	   those	  of	   the	  original	  prisoner’s	  dilemma.	   	  Now	   there	  are	  two	   equilibria:	   If	   both	   players	   follow	   the	   cooperative	   norm	   they	  will	   play	   the	   optimal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Other	   Cooperate	   Defect	  
	  	   Cooperate	   	  	   B,	  B	   	  	   W,	  T	  
	   	  Defect	   	  	   T,	  W	   	  	   S,	  S	  
Self	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  equilibrium	  and	  get	  (B,B),	  whereas	  if	  they	  both	  choose	  to	  defect	  they	  get	  (S,S),	  which	  is	  worse	  than	  (B,B).	  	  Players’	  payoffs	  in	  the	  new	  coordination	  game	  differ	  from	  the	  original	  payoffs	  because	  their	  preferences	  and	  beliefs	  will	  reflect	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  norm,	  which	  has	  affected	  players’	   incentives.	   	  More	  specifically,	   if	   a	  player	  knows	   that	  a	   cooperative	  norm	   exists	   and	   has	   the	   right	   kind	   of	   expectations,	   then	   she	  will	   have	   a	   preference	   to	  conform	  to	  the	  norm	  in	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  she	  can	  choose	  to	  cooperate	  or	  to	  defect.	  	  In	  the	  new	  game	  generated	  by	  the	  norm,	  choosing	  to	  defect	  when	  others	  cooperate	  is	  not	  a	  good	  choice	  anymore	  (T,W).	  	  The	  existence	  of	  sanctions	  for	  non-­‐compliance	  explains	  the	  lower	  payoff.	  	  	  
The	   honor	   killing	   norm	   is	   quite	   different.	   	   This	   is	   not	   a	   pro-­‐social	   norm	   in	   the	  sense	   cooperation	  or	   reciprocity	  norms	  are.	   	  We	  do	  not	  have	   a	   social	   dilemma	   to	   start	  with,	   so	  casting	   the	  norm	  as	  arising	   from	  a	  mixed-­‐motive	  game	  would	  be	  a	  mistake.	   	   It	  does	   not	   arise	   from	   a	   coordination	   problem	   either,	   since	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	   imagine	   a	  situation	  in	  which	  there	  are	  many	  equipossible	  ‘honor	  codes’	  people	  can	  end	  up	  adopting,	  and	  what	  matters	  to	  them	  is	  just	  to	  collectively	  pick	  (or	  stumble	  upon)	  one.	  	  	  In	  cultures	  in	  which	  the	  reputation	  and	  honor	  of	  the	  family	  are	  the	  most	  important	  attributes,	  failure	  by	  a	  member	  to	   follow	  adequate	  moral	  conduct	  weakens	  the	  social	  status	  of	   the	  family.	  	  The	  unwed	  girls	   of	   a	   shamed	   family	  will	   not	   find	   a	  husband,	   and	  men	   relatives	  will	   be	  scorned	   and	   ridiculed.	   	   The	   only	  way	   to	   restore	   honor	   and	   reputation	   is	   to	   ‘cut	   away’	  what	  brings	  shame.	  	  Since	  in	  these	  cultures	  honor	  is	  often	  linked	  to	  the	  ‘purity’	  of	  women,	  the	  duty	  to	  restore	  the	  lost	  honor	  is	  to	  ‘cut	  away’	  the	  lost	  woman	  by	  killing	  her.	  	  	  	  
Yet	  when	  the	  norm	  is	  in	  place,	  we	  do	  have	  a	  coordination	  game,	  since	  a	  player	  can	  decide	   to	   obey/disobey	   the	   norm,	   but	   in	   this	   case,	   unlike	   the	   case	   of	   a	   norm	   of	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  cooperation,	   the	   honor	   killing	   norm	   may	   be	   an	   inferior	   equilibrium.	   	   As	   I	   already	  mentioned,	   keeping	   the	   honor	   code	   is	   costly	   (you	   will	   have	   to	   kill	   your	   straying	  daughter/sister	   or	   be	   forever	   dishonored),	   and	   all	   would	   benefit	   from	   some	   other	  arrangement.	  	  To	  see	  that,	  let’s	  look	  at	  the	  following	  matrix,	  where	  the	  payoffs	  go	  from	  B	  (best)	  to	  W	  (worst)	  and	  we	  assume	  for	  simplicity	  that	  Others	  are	  all	  choosing	  the	  same	  strategy,	  i.e.,	  to	  embrace	  the	  honor	  killing	  code	  (H)	  or	  to	  abandon	  it	  (Not	  H):	  
	  












B,	  B	  	  
Figure	  3	  
	  
Observe	   that	   for	  H	   to	   be	   a	   strict	   equilibrium,	   it	   is	   necessary	   that	   the	   action	   of	   a	   single	  player	   (Self	   alone	   chooses	   to	   stick	   to	   the	  honor	   code	  H)	   imposes	  costs	   to	  all	   the	  others	  who	   have	   chosen	   a	   different	   path	   (Not	   H).	   	   For	   example,	   if	   the	   whole	   community	   has	  rejected	  honor	  killing	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  more	  humane	  and	  respectful	  treatment	  of	  women,	  they	  will	  have	  to	  punish	  the	  deviant	  as	  violating	  human	  rights,	  as	  well	  as	  being	  shaken	  by	  the	  brutality	  of	  the	  act.	  	  The	  worse	  case	  scenario	  for	  Self	  is	  still	  one	  in	  which	  she	  flaunts	  the	  
	   21	  honor	  code	  when	  it	  is	  still	  adopted	  by	  the	  group.	  	  So	  Self	  is	  punished	  if	  he	  disobeys	  the	  norm,	  as	  he	  imposes	  a	  cost	  on	  the	  others	  who	  instead	  follow	  it	  (W,T)	  by	  giving	  women	  a	  bad	  example	  of	   leniency,	  but	  Self	   is	  also	  punished	   if	  he	  sticks	   to	   the	  norm	  when	  others	  have	   changed	   their	   ways.	   	   These	   two	   sanctions	   will	   significantly	   differ.	   	   In	   the	  disobedience	   case,	   the	   group	  would	   ridicule	   and	   ostracize	   Self	   as	  well	   as	   his	   family;	   if	  instead	  Self	  keeps	  following	  the	  (costly)	  honor	  code	  when	  others	  have	  abandoned	  it,	  he	  would	  bear	  a	  significant	  personal	  cost	  without	  reaping	  any	  status	  benefits.	  	  	  
The	  two	  off-­‐diagonal	  boxes	  have	  asymmetric	  payoffs	  for	  Self	  because	  I	  am	  assuming	  that	  the	  direction	  of	   collective	  change	   is	   from	  honor	  killing	   (the	  original	  norm)	   to	  no	  honor	  killing.	  	  When	  a	  norm	  is	  abandoned,	  the	  curmudgeon	  that	  won’t	  change	  his	  ways	  loses	  out.	  	  The	  story	  (and	  the	  payoffs)	  would	  be	  very	  different	  in	  case	  a	  new	  norm	  is	  built,	  as	  people	  move	   from	  no	  honor	  killing	   to	  honor	  killing.	   	   In	   this	  case,	   the	   trendsetter	  who	  suggests	  that	   honor	   killing	   is	   a	   way	   of	   showing	   family	   devotion	   and	   protecting	   purity	   may	   be	  offering	  other	  people	  something	  compelling	  that	  induces	  them	  to	  join	  in.	   	  And	  he	  would	  benefit	   from	   being	   in	   the	   vanguard	   and	   innovative.	   Unfortunately,	   the	   matrix	  representation	   is	   a	   poor	   tool	   to	   characterize	   the	   asymmetry	   between	   building	   and	  abandoning	  a	  norm,	  because	  it	  cannot	  represent	  temporal	  direction.	  	  
The	  simple	  matrix	  representation	  tells	  us	  just	  one	  thing:	  any	  social	  norm,	  however	  generated,	  creates	  a	  coordination	  game	  of	  which	  it	  is	  an	  equilibrium.	  	  This	  simply	  means	  that,	   in	   the	   presence	   of	   any	   norm,	   there	   are	   always	   two	   possible	   equilibria:	   either	   all	  follow	   the	   norm,	   or	   nobody	   does.4	  	   Note,	   however,	   the	   profound	   difference	   that	   exists	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Note	  that	  the	  simple	  game	  theoretic	  representation	   given	  here	  could	  also	  represent	  situations	  in	  which,	  for	  a	  norm	  to	  be	  followed,	  it	  is	  sufficient	  that	  a	  majority	  follows	  it.	  	  In	  that	  case,	  Self	  will	  have	  to	  believe	  that	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  between	  norms	  and	  conventions	  in	  this	  respect.	  	  A	  convention	  is	  characterized	  as	  one	  of	  many	  possible	  equilibria	  of	  a	  coordination	  game.	  	  Once	  players	  converge	  to	  one	  of	  them,	  deviating	  has	  a	  cost	  for	  the	  deviant,	  but	  not	  for	  the	  group.	  	  With	  norms	  instead,	  deviations	  always	   involve	  negative	  externalities,	  which	  means	   that	   the	   deviation	   of	   one	   individual	  impacts	   in	   a	   negative	   way	   all	   others.	   	   A	   typical	   example	   of	   multi-­‐person	   coordination	  game	  would	  be	  the	  following:	  
	  
	  	  	  	  Others	  	  Self	   All	  play	  A	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  All	  play	  B	   	  	  	  	  	  All	  play	  C	  A	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1,1	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  0,	  1-­‐ε	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  0,1-­‐ε B	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  0,	  1-­‐ε	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1,1	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  0,	  1-­‐ε	  C	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  0,	  1-­‐ε	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  0,	  1-­‐ε	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1,1	  	  
Figure	  4	  
I	   am	   assuming	   here	   that	   Others	   (All)	   are	   all	   playing	   the	   same	   strategy,	   so	   that	   their	  payoffs	  are	  not	  changed	  in	  a	  perceptible	  way	  by	  Self’s	  deviation.5	  Suppose	  that	  A,	  B	  and	  C	  represent	  alternative	  ways	  of	  greeting	  strangers.	   	  Strangers	  being	   introduced	  may	  bow,	  shake	   hands,	   or	   put	   the	   palms	   together	   in	   front	   of	   the	   chest	   (as	   in	   India).	   	   Assume	   all	  members	   of	   a	   specific	   population	   coordinate	   on	   one	   of	   these	   greetings.	   	   Self	   is	   clearly	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  the	  majority	  of	  Others	  are	  norm-­‐followers,	  and	  that	  his	  deviation	  is	  not	  critical,	  i.e.,	  it	  will	  have	  no	  effect	  on	  the	  number	  of	  followers.	  	  5	  In	  fact,	  the	  change	  is	  insignificant	  and	  not	  perceived	  (it	  lowers	  the	  payoff	  	  of	  everyone	  else	  by	  ε, which	  	  is	  close	  to	  zero).	  	  However,	  were	  many	  players	  to	  deviate,	  a	  tipping	  point	  may	  be	  reached,	  where	  the	  payoff	  of	  the	  convention	  followers	  would	  be	  diminished	  in	  a	  significant	  way.	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  better	  off	  by	  following	  the	  existing	  convention.	  	  Doing	  otherwise	  may	  lead	  to	  confusion,	  and	  being	  perceived	  as	  uncouth	  and	   inappropriate.	  Failing	   to	  coordinate	  with	  Others	   is	  just	  Self’s	  loss.	  	  All	  the	  others	  who	  follow	  the	  convention	  will	  not	  suffer	  a	  perceptible	  loss	  if	  Self	  deviates	  from	  it;	  however,	   if	  a	  greater	  number	  of	   ‘deviants’	  were	  to	  be	  present	  in	  the	  group,	  the	  loss	  may	  become	  significant	  (and	  perceived	  as	  such),	  as	  coordination	  may	  be	  lost.	   	  This	  example	  could	  represent	  any	  convention	  adopted	  by	  a	  large	  group.	  	  It	  is	  in	  everyone’s	  interest	  to	  keep	  following	  it,	  and	  the	  lone	  deviant	  will	  pay	  a	  price,	  but	  she	  will	  not	  be	  sanctioned	  by	  the	  community,	  since	  Others	  incur	  no	  perceptible	  cost.	  	  	  
A	  more	  ambiguous	  story	  would	  be	  that	  of	  two	  parties	  who	  have	  to	  coordinate	  on	  a	  particular	   signaling	   code.	   	   Suppose	   Self	   and	  Other	  have	   two	  possible	   signaling	   systems	  available,	   Red	   and	   Blue,	   each	   most	   preferred	   by	   one	   of	   them.	   The	   following	   matrix	  represents	  this	  situation,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  fact	  that	  both	  players	  want	  to	  communicate	  and	  prefer	   that	   outcome	   to	   following	   their	   particular	   inclinations	   (i.e.,	   Self	   will	   not	   choose	  Blue,	   her	  most	   preferred	   code,	   unless	   she	   is	   sure	   Other	   also	   chooses	   it).	   	   Clearly	   both	  players	  lose	  by	  mis-­‐coordinating.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Other	  Self	   Red	   Blue	  Red	   1,2	   0,0	  Blue	   0,0	   2,1	  	  
Figure	  5	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Now	  imagine	  that	  the	  players	  happen	  to	  converge,	  by	  trial	  and	  error,	  communication	  or	  any	  other	  reason,	  on	  Red	  as	  their	  common	  signaling	  code.	  	  A	  unilateral	  deviation	  will	  still	  damage	  both	  players	  but,	  depending	  on	  the	  costs	  imposed	  on	  the	  party	  that	  sticks	  to	  the	  convention,	   the	   damage	   may	   be	   greater	   for	   one	   of	   them.	   For	   example,	   if	   Red	   is	   the	  conventional	   code,	   and	   Other	   deviates,	   Self	   will	   feel	   doubly	   damaged:	   she	   is	   not	  coordinating	   with	   Other	   and	   she	   was	   ‘sacrificing’	   by	   choosing	   a	   code	   that	   she	   did	   not	  much	  like	  to	  start	  with.	  	  The	  matrix	  would	  thus	  look	  like	  the	  following:	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Other	  Self	   Red	  	   Blue	  	  Red	  	   1,	  2	   -­‐1,	  0	  Blue	  	   0,	  -­‐1	   2,	  1	  	  
Figure	  6	  
In	   this	   case	   it	   seems	   reasonable	   to	   assume	   that	   some	   form	  of	   sanction	  might	  be	  put	   in	  place	   to	   discourage	   even	   ‘innocent	  mistakes’.	   	   For	   example,	   the	   players	  may	   decide	   to	  impose	  a	  monetary	  penalty	  on	  the	  distracted	  party.	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Figure	  7	  
Has	   the	   original	   convention	  morphed	   into	   a	   norm?	   	   Is	   Other	   sticking	   to	   the	   Red	   code	  because	  he	  fears	  the	  punishment	  that	  will	  surely	  follow	  a	  deviation,	  or	  still	  chooses	  Red	  because,	   irrespective	  of	   the	  possible	  punishment,	   he	  badly	  wants	   to	   communicate	  with	  Self?	   	   I	   think	   the	   answer	   lies	   in	   assessing	   the	   reason	   a	   player	   has	   for	   behaving	   in	   a	  particular	  way.	   	   In	   the	  case	  of	  a	  norm	  of	  cooperation,	   the	  shadow	  of	  external	   sanctions	  may	   be	   the	   main	   or	   even	   the	   sole	   reason	   why	   one	   chooses	   to	   cooperate,	   otherwise	  cooperation	  would	  not	  be	  in	  one’s	  best	  interest.	  	  Following	  an	  honor	  killing	  code,	  too,	  may	  be	   chiefly	   motivated	   by	   the	   sanctions	   that	   a	   transgression	   brings	   about.	   	   Killing	   one’s	  daughter	  or	  sister	  presumably	  has	  a	  high	  psychological	  cost,	  so	  one	  should	  be	  ‘pushed’	  to	  do	   it.6	  	   In	   a	   convention,	  which	   is	  usually	   followed	  by	  many	  people	   (as	   in	  Figure	  3),	   the	  main	  reason	  to	  adhere	  to	  it	  is	  the	  desire	  to	  coordinate	  with	  others	  in	  order	  to	  fulfill	  one’s	  goals,	   which	   happen	   to	   coincide	  with	   others’	   goals.	   	   The	   only	   sanction	   that	  matters	   is	  one’s	   failure	   to	   coordinate,	   which	   presumably	   has	   a	   cost.	   	   Even	   in	   a	   two-­‐person	  convention,	  when	  the	  aim	  is	  mutual	  coordination,	  there	  is	  no	  tension	  between	  what	  one	  wants	  to	  do	  and	  what	  one	  is	  expected	  to	  do,	  regardless	  of	  the	  sanctions	  that	  the	  parties	  may	  want	   to	   impose	  on	   each	  other	   to	  discourage	   reckless	  deviations.	   	   In	   a	   convention,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Typically	  the	  killing	  occurs	  after	  a	  period	  of	  warnings	  and	  is	  decided	  by	  the	  whole	  family.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Other	  Self	   Red	  	   Blue	  	  Red	  	   1,	  2	   -­‐1,	  -­‐2	  Blue	  	   -­‐2,	  -­‐1	   2,	  1	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  players	  may	  experience	  a	   form	  of	  what	   is	  called	  moral	  hazard:	  Since	  I	  know	  that	  you	  still	  want	  to	  coordinate	  with	  me,	  and	  that	  a	  small	  ‘distraction’	  will	  not	  harm	  me	  too	  much,	  I	  may	  become	  cavalier	  in	  my	  behavior.	  	  To	  avoid	  this	  form	  of	  moral	  hazard,	  players	  may	  want	  to	  impose	  heavier	  sanctions.	  	  
	  
The	  power	  of	  expectations	  and	  epistemic	  traps	  
A	   game	   theoretic	   account	   proves	   too	   limited	   to	   permit	   a	   meaningful	  discrimination	   in	  many	   ambiguous	   cases.	   	   The	   numbers	   (or	   letters)	   in	   the	   cells	   of	   the	  matrix	   represent	   ‘utiles’	   or	   preferences;	   we	   model	   choices	   as	   more	   or	   less	   costly	   or	  beneficial	  and	  rank	  choices	  according	  to	   the	  costs/benefits	   they	  confer	  on	  the	  decision-­‐maker,	  but	  we	  have	  no	  tools	  to	  say,	  as	  in	  the	  ambiguous	  case	  of	  Figure	  7,	  what	  costs	  (lack	  of	  coordination	  or	  external	  punishment)	  matter	  most	  to	  the	  players.	  	  Saying	  that	  a	  norm	  or	  a	  convention	   is	  an	  equilibrium	   just	  says	   that,	   if	  a	  player	  expects	  conformity,	  she	  will	  have	  no	  reason	  to	  deviate	  and,	  if	  everyone	  expects	  conformity,	  these	  expectations	  will	  be	  self-­‐fulfilling.	  Such	  equilibria	  are	  self-­‐perpetuating:	  the	  belief	  that	  the	  norm/convention	  is	  (almost)	   universally	   endorsed	   generates	   widespread	   conformity,	   and	   observation	   of	  conformity	   further	   confirms	   expectations	   of	   universal	   endorsement.	   In	   other	   words,	  game	   theory,	   while	   it	   stresses	   the	   importance	   of	   interdependence	   and	   mutual	  expectations,	  does	  not	  convey	  any	  information	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  such	  expectations.	  	  Yet	  it	   is	   precisely	   the	   types	   of	   expectation	   that	   guide	   us	   that	   distinguish	   a	   norm	   from	   a	  convention.	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  Let’s	  go	  back	   for	  a	  moment	   to	   the	   two	  games	  of	  Figure	  1	  and	  2.	   	  For	  a	  player	  who	   is	   playing	   a	   regular	   prisoner’s	   dilemma,	   being	   informed	   that	   her	   partner	   is	   an	  altruist	  that	  always	  cooperates	  is	  not	  sufficient	  to	  induce	  reciprocal	  cooperation.	   	  It	  will	  instead	   strengthen	   the	   temptation	   to	  defect.	   	   But	   if	   a	   norm	  of	   cooperation	   exits,	   things	  have	   changed.	   Now	   if	   one	   expects	   the	   other	   to	   cooperate,	   reciprocal	   cooperation	   has	  become	  the	  best	  choice.	  	  Why?	  	  Because	  defecting	  triggers	  negative	  sanctions.	  	  The	  same	  happens	  with	  a	  norm	  of	  honor	  killing	  (Figure	  3).	   	   If	  one	  expects	  others	  to	  follow	  it,	  and	  also	  expects	  to	  be	  punished	  for	  not	  conforming	  (and	  be	  rewarded	  for	  compliance),	  there	  is	  every	  reason	  to	  obey.	  	  In	  both	  cases	  there	  is	  something	  else,	  beyond	  expecting	  others	  to	  conform,	   that	   motivates	   conformity:	   a	   normative	   component	   that	   is	   absent	   in	   a	  convention.	   	   To	   understand	   this	   important	   point,	   let	   us	   define	  more	   explicitly	   the	   two	  kinds	  of	  expectation	  that	  support	  norm	  compliance:	  
(a)	  Empirical	  expectations:	  individuals	  believe	  that	  a	  sufficiently	  large	  part	  of	  the	  relevant	  group/population	  conforms	  to	  the	  norm	  and7	  	  
(b)	   Normative	   expectations:	   individuals	   believe	   that	   a	   sufficiently	   large	   part	   of	   the	  relevant	  group/population	  believes	  they	  ought	  to	  conform	  to	  the	  norm	  and	  may	  sanction	  behavior.8	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Note	  that	  the	  “sufficiently	  large	  part”	  clause	  tells	  us	  that	  universal	  compliance	  is	  not	  usually	  needed	  for	  a	  norm	  to	  exist.	  	  A	  few	  transgressions	  are	  a	  fact	  of	  life.	  	  However,	  how	  much	  deviance	  is	  socially	  tolerable	  will	  depend	  upon	  the	  norm	  in	  question;	  small	  group	  norms	  (think	  of	  a	  youth	  gang’s	  rules),	  and	  well-­‐entrenched	  social	  norms	  (think	  of	  reciprocating	  favors)	  will	  typically	  be	  followed	  by	  almost	  all	  members	  of	  a	  group	  or	  population	   whereas	   with	   new	   norms	   or	   norms	   that	   are	   not	   deemed	   to	   be	   socially	   important	   greater	  deviance	   is	   usually	   accepted	   (think	   of	   the	   bride	   wearing	   a	   white	   dress).	   	   Furthermore,	   as	   it	   is	   usually	  unclear	  how	  many	  people	  follow	  a	  norm,	  different	  individuals	  may	  have	  different	  beliefs	  about	  the	  size	  of	  the	  group	  of	   followers,	   and	  may	  also	  have	  different	   thresholds	   for	  what	   ‘sufficiently	   large’	  means.	   	  What	  matters	   to	   individual	   conformity	   is	   that	   an	   individual	   believes	   that	   her	   threshold	   has	   been	   reached	   or	  surpassed.	  	  	  
	   28	  If	   having	   both	   types	   of	   belief	   buttresses	   norm	   compliance,	   it	   follows	   that	   one	   may	  follow	   a	   norm	   in	   the	   presence	   of	   the	   relevant	   expectations,	   but	   disregard	   it	   in	   their	  absence.	  	  To	  be	  more	  specific:	  
(c)	   Conditional	   preference:	   individuals	   will	   prefer	   to	   conform	   to	   a	   social	   norm	   on	  condition	  of	  holding	  the	  relevant	  empirical	  and	  normative	  expectations.	  	  	  
Note	   that	   conditional	   preferences	   for	   conforming	   to	   a	   norm	   are	   different	   from	   a	  preference	   for	  what	   the	   norm	   stands	   for.	   	   For	   example,	  my	   reason	   to	   engage	   in	   honor	  killing	   or	   cooperate	   in	   a	   given	   situation	   does	   not	   mean	   I	   have	   a	   general	   motive	   to	  cooperate	  or	  kill	   to	  save	  my	  honor	  as	  such.	   	  Having	  conditional	  preferences	  also	  means	  that,	  were	  my	  expectations	  to	  change,	  my	  behavior	  would	  change,	  too.	  	  	  
The	  triad	  of	  empirical	  and	  normative	  expectations	  and	  conditional	  preferences	  is	  what,	   in	  my	  view,	  defines	  social	  norms.	   	   It	   is	  a	  richer	  definition	  than	  the	  game-­‐theoretic	  one,	  since	  it	  allows	  for	  a	  clearer	  distinction	  between	  norms	  and	  conventions	  based	  upon	  which	  expectations	  matter	  to	  choice.	   	  We	  can	  now	  say	  that	  a	  convention	  is	  defined	  by	  a	  simpler	   dyad:	   empirical	   expectations	   and	   conditional	   preferences.	   	   In	   order	   to	   adopt	   a	  signaling	  code	  convention,	  I	  only	  need	  to	  believe	  that	  almost	  everyone	  has	  adopted	  it.	  	  My	  preference	   for	   using	   that	   specific	   code	   is	   conditional	   upon	   having	   certain	   empirical	  expectations	  of	  group	  compliance	  and	  nothing	  else.	   	  On	  the	  contrary,	  my	  preference	  for	  carrying	  out	  an	  act	  of	  honor	  killing	  depends	  on	  believing	  that	  this	  is	  the	  customary	  norm	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  It	  is	  important	  to	  emphasize	  that	  sometimes	  we	  obey	  norms	  just	  because	  we	  recognize	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  other’s	  expectations	  (Sugden	  2001).	  	  In	  this	  case,	  it	  is	  not	  so	  much	  the	  external	  sanction	  that	  matters,	  but	  an	  internal	   one.	   	   Transgressions	   are	   avoided	   precisely	   because	   one	   feels	   others	   have	   a	   ‘right’	   to	   expect	   a	  certain	  kind	  of	  behavior,	  and	  one	  has	  an	  ‘obligation’	  to	  fulfill	  others’	  expectations.	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  in	  my	  community,	  that	  I	  am	  expected	  to	  perform	  such	  an	  act	  and	  that	  my	  whole	  family	  will	  be	  dishonored	  and	  ostracized	  if	  I	  do	  not	  perform	  as	  I	  should.	  	  	  	  
It	   is	  worthwhile	   to	  point	  out	   that	  whereas	  empirical	  expectations	  are	   first-­‐order	  beliefs	   (I	   believe	   others	   will	   do	   so	   and	   so),	   normative	   expectations	   are	   second-­‐order	  
beliefs:	   they	   are	   beliefs	   about	   the	   beliefs	   of	   other	  members	   of	   the	   collective	   (I	   believe	  others	  believe	  I	  should	  do	  so	  and	  so).	  	  One’s	  personal	  inclination	  to	  support,	  like	  or	  dislike	  a	  particular	  social	  norm	  is	  not	  the	  most	  relevant	  variable	  in	  determining	  one’s	  allegiance	  to	  it.	  	  Normative	  expectations	  do	  matter,	  and	  they	  may	  significantly	  differ	  from	  personal	  normative	   beliefs.	   	   A	   personal	   normative	   belief	   that,	   say,	   a	   family	   should	   ensure	   their	  daughters	   are	   married	   as	   soon	   as	   they	   reach	   puberty	   may	   agree	   with	   the	   normative	  expectation	   about	   what	   one’s	   community	   believes	   is	   appropriate	   behavior,	   but	   it	   also	  happens	  that	  individuals	  dislike	  behaviors	  mandated	  by	  a	  shared	  norm.	  	  When	  personal	  beliefs	   and	  normative	   expectations	   disagree,	   I	   predict	   that	   normative	   expectations,	   not	  personal	   normative	   beliefs,	   will	   guide	   behavior.	   	   This	   is	   in	   line	   with	   what	   social	  psychologists	  have	  observed:	  beliefs	  that	  are	  perceived	  to	  be	  shared	  by	  a	  relevant	  group	  will	  affect	  action,	  whereas	  personal	  normative	  beliefs	  often	  fail	  to	  do	  so,	  especially	  when	  they	  deviate	  from	  socially	  held	  beliefs.	  	  	  
	   If	  we	  come	  back	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  norm	  stability,	  we	  can	  now	  see	  that	  a	  social	  norm	  is	  stable	  insofar	  as	  a	  majority	  of	  followers	  are	  motivated	  to	  conform.	  	  Since	  conforming	  to	  a	  social	   norm	   is	   conditionally	   preferred	   (otherwise	  we	   are	   dealing	  with	  moral	   norms	   or	  values),	   a	   norm’s	   stability	   will	   be	   a	   function	   of	   the	   stability	   of	   the	   expectations	   that	  support	  it.	  	  Let	  us	  look	  at	  a	  simple	  case	  of	  two	  different	  social	  norms,	  N1	  and	  N2	  that	  are	  present	  in	  a	  group	  G.	  	  In	  both	  cases,	  we	  have	  that:	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  1. All	  members	  of	  G	  believe	  that	  all	  other	  members	  of	  G	  follow	  N1	  and	  N2.	  	  2. All	  members	  of	  G	  believe	  that	  all	  other	  members	  of	  G	  believe	  one	  ought	  to	  follow	  N1	  and	  N2.	  	  
However,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  N2,	  it	  is	  not	  true	  that	  “all	  members	  of	  G	  believe	  one	  ought	  to	  follow	  N2.”	  	  In	  fact,	  a	  majority	  of	  individuals	  dislike	  N2,	  and	  do	  not	  think	  for	  a	  moment	  one	  ought	  to	   follow	   it.	   	   	  Yet	   they	  observe	  compliance,	  or	  what	   they	   think	  are	   the	  consequences	  of	  compliance,	  and	  have	  no	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  those	  who	  conform	  to	  the	  norm	  dislike	  it	  as	  much	   as	   they	   do.	   	   So	   they	   do	   not	   dare	   speak	   out	   or	   openly	   transgress,	   and	   a	   norm	  nobody	   likes	   keeps	   being	   followed	   or,	   if	   transgressions	   occur,	   they	  will	   be	   kept	   secret.	  	  This	   is	  a	   case	  of	  what	   is	  known	  as	  pluralistic	  ignorance,	   a	   cognitive	  state	   in	  which	  each	  believes	   her	   attitudes	   and	   preferences	   are	   different	   from	   those	   of	   similarly	   situated	  others,	  even	  if	  public	  behavior	  is	  identical	  (Miller	  and	  McFarland	  1987).	  	  I	  maintain	  that	  the	  ensuing	  set	  of	  conditions	  is	  a	  fertile	  ground	  for	  pluralistic	  ignorance:	  
a) Individuals	  engage	  in	  social	  comparison	  with	  their	  reference	  group.	  We	  constantly	  observe	   what	   others	   do	   and	   get	   clues	   as	   to	   appropriate	   behavior,	   others’	  preferences,	   etc.	   	   In	   the	   case	   of	   norms,	  we	   are	   influenced	   by	   the	   preferences	   of	  other	   group	  members,	   but	  we	  do	  not	   know	   the	   true	  distribution	  of	  preferences,	  which	  we	  try	  to	  infer	  from	  observing	  their	  behavior.	  	  b) Others’	   behavior	   is	   observable.	   	   If	   not,	   the	   consequences	   of	   such	   behavior	   are	  observable.	  For	  example,	  compliance	  with	  norms	  that	  regulate	  sexual	  behavior	  or	  other	   unobservable	   behaviors	   can	   be	   assessed	   by	   observing	   the	   presence	   or	  absence	  of	  the	  consequences	  of	  such	  behaviors.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  norms	  that	  prohibit	  pre-­‐marital	  sex,	  teen	  pregnancies	  would	  be	  a	  sign	  that	  the	  norm	  has	  been	  flouted.	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  c) No	  transparent	  communication	  is	  possible.	  	  Because	  of	  shared	  values,	  religious	  reasons,	   or	   simply	   the	   fear	   of	   being	   shunned	   or	   ridiculed	   as	   a	   deviant	   or	   just	  different,	  we	  do	  not	  express	  views	  that	  we	  think	  will	  put	  us	  at	  a	  disadvantage.	  	  d) It	  is	  assumed	  that,	  unlike	  us,	  others’	  behavior	  is	  consistent	  with	  their	  attitudes	  and	  preferences.	   	   There	   are	   several	   possible	   reasons	  why	   this	  might	   occur.	   	   Fear	   of	  embarrassment	  or	  the	  desire	  to	  fit	  in	  are	  not	  easy	  to	  observe,	  so	  we	  may	  come	  to	  believe	  that	  we	  experience	  these	  emotions	  more	  strongly	  than	  others	  do.	  	  Another	  possible	  cause	  of	  the	  self/other	  discrepancy	  is	  what	  is	  called	  the	  attribution	  error:	  	  We	  tend	  to	  overestimate	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  others	  act	  on	  private	  motives	  (beliefs,	  preferences)	   and	   instead	   attribute	   our	   own	   behavior	   to	   external	   factors	   (social	  pressure	  in	  this	  case).	  	  e) It	  is	  inferred	  that	  all	  but	  us	  endorse	  the	  observed	  norm.	  	  We	  discount	  our	  personal	  evidence	  in	  favor	  of	  what	  we	  observe	  and	  take	  it	  at	  face	  value.	  	  f) All	  end	  up	  conforming	  to	  the	  public	  norm,	  oblivious	  to	  the	  possibility	  that	  they	  are	  participants	  in	  a	  group	  dynamic	  in	  which	  all	  pretend	  to	  support	  the	  norm,	  but	  in	  fact	  all	  dislike	  it.	  	  	  
In	  a	  state	  of	  pluralistic	  ignorance,	  individuals	  are	  caught	  into	  an	  epistemic	  trap	  and	  will	  keep	  following	  a	  norm	  they	  deeply	  dislike.	  	  How	  long	  can	  this	  last?	  	  One	  may	  suspect	  that	  a	  norm	  that	  is	  so	  much	  disliked	  would	  not	  be	  stable,	  since	  even	  small	  shocks	  to	  the	  system	  of	   beliefs	   that	   support	   it	  would	   lead	   to	   its	   demise.	   	   Once	   the	   frequency	   of	   true	  beliefs	   is	   conveyed	   to	   the	   relevant	   population,	   a	   change	   would	   occur.	   	   This	   is	   only	  partially	  true.	  	  When	  actions	  are	  strongly	  interdependent,	  it	  is	  not	  sufficient	  to	  know,	  and	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  possibly	  reach	  common	  knowledge,	  that	  most	  group	  members	  dislike	  N2.	  	  Since	  a	  norm	  is	   supported	   by	   normative	   expectations,	   the	   participants	   must	   also	   be	   sure	   that	   its	  abandonment	  will	  not	  be	  followed	  by	  negative	  sanctions.	  	  People	  face	  a	  double	  credibility	  problem:	  they	  must	  believe	  that	  the	  information	  they	  receive	  about	  the	  group	  members’	  true	   beliefs	   is	   accurate,	   and	   they	  must	   also	   believe	   that	   everyone	   else	   is	   committed	   to	  change	   their	  ways.	   	  There	  are	  many	  ways	   to	  achieve	   these	  goals,	   and	   there	  are	   several	  examples	   in	   the	   literature	   of	   successful	   change	   of	   negative	   norms	   by	   means	   of	  information	  campaigns,	  public	  declarations	  and	  common	  pledges	  (Bicchieri	  and	  Mercier	  2011).	  
	  I	  have	  stated	   that	  a	  norm	   that	   is	  beneficial	   to	   society	   is	   in	  principle	  more	  stable	  than	  one	  that	  is	  not,	  or	  that	  is	  even	  secretly	  disliked	  by	  its	  followers.	  	  Stability,	  however,	  is	  not	  a	  direct	  function	  of	  the	  social	  benefits	  a	  norm	  confers	  upon	  its	  followers.	  	  It	  must	  be	  the	  case	  that	   this	  beneficial	   function	   is	  recognized	  and	  expressed	   in	  the	  beliefs	  of	   those	  who	  conform	  to	  the	  norm,	  i.e.,	  there	  must	  be	  a	  shared	  belief	  that	  the	  norm	  is	  valuable	  for	  the	  group	  that	  embraces	  it.	  	  Since	  mutual	  beliefs	  support	  social	  norms,	  a	  norm’s	  stability	  is	  a	  direct	  function	  of	  the	  stability	  of	  those	  beliefs.	  	  
	  
Conclusion	  
	   I	  have	  presented	  a	  view	  of	  social	  norms	  that,	  though	  it	  encompasses	  the	  traditional	  understanding	   of	   what	   a	   social	   norm	   is	   (e.g.,	   behavior	   that	   is	   collectively	   approved	   or	  disapproved	  and	  is	  enforced	  by	  sanctions)	  goes	  well	  beyond	  it.	   	  Norms	  exist	  because	  of	  the	  expectations	  of	  those	  who	  follow	  them.	  	  These	  expectations	  are	  not	  just	  empirical,	  as	  




Suggestions	  for	  further	  readings	  For	   a	   general	   survey	   of	   the	   literature	   on	   social	   norms,	   you	   may	   read	   Bicchieri	   and	  Muldoon	  (2011).	  	  The	  game-­‐theoretic	  view	  of	  conventions	  is	  to	  be	  found	  in	  Lewis	  (1969).	  	  Parsons	   (1951)	   and	   Coleman	   (1990)	   offer	   the	   traditional	   and	   the	  modern	   sociological	  views	   of	   norms,	   respectively.	   	   Bicchieri	   (2006)	   presents	   a	   theory	   of	   social	   norms	   that	  combines	  game	  theory	  and	  psychology.	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